

Message Text

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 124656 TOSEC 020085

NODIS

CHEROKEE

FOLLOWING REPEAT PARIS 13581 ACTION SECSTATE DATED 28 MAY 75

QUOTE

S E C R E T PARIS 13581

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CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRES GISCARD D'ESTAING

1. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING, SECRETARY KISSINGER, FONMIN SAUVAGNARGUES AND I MET FOR AN HOUR AND 30 MINUTES OVER BREAKFAST AT THE ELYSEE ON MAY 27. PRINCIPAL TOPICS OF CONVERSATION WERE GENERAL INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, INCLUDING SOUTHEAST ASIA, KOREA AND PORTUGAL; US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS; ENERGY AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. END SUMMARY.

2. INTERNATIONAL SITUATION: PRES GISCARD ASKED THE SECRETARY FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTER-
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MATH. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE COLLAPSE OF SOUTH VIETNAM MIGHT HAVE OCCURRED IN ANY CASE, BUT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN PREFERABLE HAD THE PERIOD BETWEEN U.S. INVOLVEMENT AND THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER BEEN STRETCHED

OUT. HAD THE TIME GAP BEEN LONGER IT WOULD HAVE BEEN CLEAR THAT SOUTH VIETNAM FELL BECAUSE OF THE WEAKNESS OF ITS OWN POLITICAL SYSTEM RATHER THAN BECAUSE OF ACTION OR LACK OF ACTION BY THE U.S. HE ATTRIBUTED THE COLLAPSE INsofar AS THE U.S. WAS INVOLVED TO THREE FACTORS: (A) THE EROSION OF PRESIDENTIAL

AUTHORITY IN THE U.S., RESULTING PRIMARILY FROM WATER-GATE; (B) LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS BY WHICH CONGRESS HAMPERED MILITARY ACTION AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT; AND (C) CUTS IN MILITARY AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM BY NEARLY HALF WHICH BROUGHT HOME TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE THEIR LACK OF SUPPORT IN THE U.S. AND LEFT THEM WITHOUT SUFFICIENT AMMUNITION AND MATERIAL TO CARRY ON.

3. AS TO THE AFTERMATH, THE SECRETARY SAID IT WAS BETTER THAT THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OCCURRED IN A MATTER OF WEEKS RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN A LONG DRAWN-OUT AFFAIR WHICH WOULD HAVE GENERATED BITTERNESS AND DIVISIVENESS IN THE U.S. ONE OF THE MOST IMMEDIATE RESULTS OF THE DEBACLE IS A CHANGE OF MOOD IN THE U.S. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE BEGINNING TO REALIZE THAT THERE MUST BE MORE UNITY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THAT THE U.S. MUST LIVE UP TO ITS COMMITMENTS ABROAD AND THAT ISOLATIONISM IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. SENATOR MANSFIELD'S RECENT DECLARATION IN FAVOR OF DEFENDING SOUTH KOREA IS EVIDENCE OF THE CHANGING MOOD.

4. PRES GISCARD COMMENTED THAT EVERYONE REALIZED NORTH VIETNAM HAD BEEN CHEATING ON THE PARIS AGREEMENT, BUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN CHEATING ON THE OTHER SIDE AS WELL, ALTHOUGH TO A LESSER DEGREE. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IN THE END SIMPLY COULD NOT RESIST A SUDDEN TAKEOVER WHEN THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED ITSELF. TURNING TO CAMBODIA, THE PRESIDENT MENTIONED THE INCREDIBLE STATE OF CORRUPTION IN PHNOM PENH PRIOR TO ITS FALL.

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THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT CORRUPTION HAD EXISTED, BUT POINTED OUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT FORCES IN PHNOM PENH REALLY FOUGHT MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN THE GOVERNMENT FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

5. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION BY PRES GISCARD ON KOREA, THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED THE SITUATION AS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS. THE U.S. IS BOUND BY TREATY TO DEFEND SOUTH KOREA AND WE WOULD UNQUESTIONABLY RESPOND TO AGGRESSION SHOULD IT OCCUR. PRES GISCARD POINTED OUT THAT GOVERNMENTS MUST ENJOY INTERNAL SUPPORT TO BE DEFENSIBLE. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE SOUTH

KOREAN GOVERNMENT HAD AGREED TO TRY TO BROADEN ITS BASE OF POPULAR SUPPORT, BUT THAT THE COLLAPSE OF SOUTH VIETNAM HAD ADVERSELY AFFECTED PROSPECTS FOR IMMEDIATE IMPROVEMENT. PRES GISCARD SAID HE WAS NOT THINKING SO MUCH OF BROADENING THE BASE AS OF INSURING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS SUCH AS FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH. WHEN THE SECRETARY ASKED IF THE PRESIDENT COULD SUGGEST A WAY OF BRINGING ABOUT SUCH CHANGES WITHOUT INTERVENING IN A COUNTRY'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, THE PRESIDENT ADMITTED HE HAD NO READY SOLUTION. THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT HE HOPED FRANCE OR OTHERS WOULD DO NOTHING TO ENCOURAGE NORTH KOREAN INTRANSIGENCE OR AGGRESSION.

6. ON PORTUGAL, THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT THE FRG GOVERNMENT AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE EEC (EXCEPT FRANCE) APPEAR WILLING TO GIVE FINANCIAL AID TO THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT OF PORTUGAL. THE SECRETARY SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND HOW SUPPORTING RADICAL ELEMENTS IN PORTUGAL WOULD HELP STRENGTHEN MODERATE FORCES. HE ADDED THAT A NON-COMMUNIST REGIME DEPENDS PRIMARILY ON THE COMMUNIST PARTY FOR SUPPORT CAN BE MORE DANGEROUS THAN AN OUT-AND-OUT COMMUNIST TAKEOVER SUCH AS IN CUBA. IN HIS VIEW THE U.S. COULD DO LITTLE VIS-A-VIS PORTUGAL WITHOUT EUROPEAN HELP AND SUPPORT. HE SAID HE STRONGLY BELIEVES THAT WHAT HAPPENS IN PORTUGAL WILL HAVE FAR-REACHING REPERCUSSIONS FOR THE REST OF EUROPE. HE POINTED OUT THAT IF PORTUGAL, BY ADMITTING COMMUNISTS

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TO A POWERFUL POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT, CAN THEREBY RECEIVE FINANCIAL AID FROM THE EEC, OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WOULD BE ATTRACTED TO TAKE THE SAME COURSE OF ACTION. IN FACT, THE REASONING WITH REGARD TO PORTUGAL AND SPAIN IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY. EVIDENTLY, EXCEPT FOR FRANCE, THE MEMBERS OF THE EEC THINK IT WISE TO EXCLUDE SPAIN FROM NATO OR THE EC ON THE THEORY THAT THEREBY THE MODERATE OPPOSITION WILL BE MADE STRONGER AND WILL LEAD SPAIN TOWARD DEMOCRACY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY SEEM TO REASON THAT BY ENCOURAGING THROUGH FINANCIAL AID A COMMUNIST-DOMINATED GOVERNMENT IN PORTUGAL, THEY WILL WEAKEN THAT GOVERNMENT AND STRENGTHEN THE MODERATE OPPOSITION, THEREBY HELPING TO TURN PORTUGAL INTO A DEMOCRATIC STATE. PRESIDENT GISCARD AGREED, ADDING THAT THE SITUATION COULD NOT GO ON AS IT IS BUT THAT ANY HASTY OR PRECIPITOUS ACTION SHOULD BE AVOIDED. FRANCE, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY TO JOIN IN ASSISTING THE GOP FINANCIALLY. FRANCE WILL RESIST, BUT THE PRESSURE WILL INCREASE.

THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT PRESIDENT FORD INTENDS TO SPEAK STRONGLY TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT ABOUT PORTUGAL AND THAT HE AGREES WITH PRESIDENT GISCARD.

7. TURNING TO ITALY, PRESIDENT GISCARD SAID THAT ITALY WILL FOLLOW THE FRENCH MODEL AND THAT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WILL NOT OPEN ITS RANKS TO MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS NOT AS OPTIMISTIC AS GISCARD AND THAT IF THE COMMUNISTS DO, IN FACT, EXERCISE POWER IN ITALY THE COUNTRY WILL LOSE ITS WESTERN CONNECTION. HE EXPRESSED SOME FEAR THAT THIS COULD HAVE A SNOWBALLING EFFECT WITH REGARD TO THE COMMUNISTS IN FRANCE. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT IN FRANCE ELECTIONS DEPEND LARGELY ON DOMESTIC ISSUES, THAT POPULAR SUPPORT FOR HIS GOVERNMENT IS NOW RUNNING AT ABOUT 55 PERCENT FAVORABLE TO 45 PERCENT UNFAVORABLE, AND HE EXPECTS THIS TREND TO CONTINUE.

8. EUROPEAN UNITY: PRES GISCARD SAID THE WESTERN WORLD WOULD BE STRONGER SUPPORTED BY TWO
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PILLARS RATHER THAN ONE. IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD THERE ARE TWO GREAT POWERS, CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION, BUT IN THE WEST THERE IS ONLY THE U.S. THE WESTERN WORLD WOULD BE MUCH STRONGER IF A STRONG, UNITED EUROPE FORMED A SECOND PILLAR. HE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT ENVISAGE ANY FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND A UNITED WESTERN EUROPE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE SHARED THAT VIEW. DURING THE POMPIDOU REGIME THERE WAS A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF CONFRONTATION BUT THE EMERGENCE OF A EUROPEAN ENTITY WHICH COULD COOPERATE WITH THE U.S. REMAINS A HIGHLY DESIRABLE GOAL. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, AS SHOWN BY THE LAST FEW YEARS, COULD BE ERRATIC AND A COMPLEMENTARY CENTER OF INFLUENCE AND STRENGTH COULD BE HELPFUL, THE SECRETARY SAID.

9. PRESIDENT GISCARD OUTLINED THE STEPS HE THOUGHT NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THIS END: (A) A CLEAR ANALYSIS OF THE DEFENSE PROBLEM. HE ADMITTED THAT IN THE PAST FRENCH BEHAVIOR MAY HAVE COMPLICATED THE DEFENSE ISSUE BUT THAT THE TIME IS NOW RIPE FOR CLARIFICATION. THE MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE SHOULD REMAIN INTEGRATED, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FRANCE. FRANCE, HOWEVER, WOULD MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN THE NECESSARY CONTACTS FOR JOINT PLANNING AND ACTION, AS IT IS CURRENTLY DOING. IT IS INDISPENSABLE, HOWEVER, THAT NEITHER PARTY TRY TO PRESSURE THE OTHER BEYOND THE PRESENT LIMITS OF COOPERATION, E.G. PRESSURE FRANCE TO JOIN THE INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE. (B) THE U.S. SHOULD HELP

EUROPE ACHIEVE POLITICAL UNITY AND STRENGTH. TRADITIONALLY THE U.S. HAD APPROACHED ISSUES BILATERALLY WITH THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY BUT, THE PRESIDENT SAID, THE TIME HAS COME TO DISCUSS ISSUES WITH THE COMMUNITY. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO ACCEPT SUCH A PROCEDURE IN PRINCIPLE BUT THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT WORK OUT IN PRACTICE. WE SUPPORT THE IDEA OF EUROPEAN UNITY AS LONG AS EUROPE IS NOT ANTAGONISTIC TO THE U.S. IN ITS CONCRETE BEHAVIOR. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE FOR EUROPE TO MOVE TOWARDS NEUTRALISM WHICH WOULD BRING IMPOTENCY. THE SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO OPPOSITION TO EUROPEAN UNITY AS LONG AS THE PRESENT

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ADMINISTRATION REMAINED IN POWER IN THE U.S. THE FORD ADMINISTRATION CAN AND WILL MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE U.S. FAVORS EUROPEAN UNITY.

10. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT FRANCE IS IN FAVOR OF ALLOWING GREECE TO JOIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, THAT THE COMMUNITY SHOULD INCLUDE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHICH ARE CULTURALLY AND SOCIALLY AN INTEGRAL PART OF EUROPE. TURKEY, HOWEVER, IS A DIFFERENT SITUATION. THE SECRETARY STATED THAT WE SHOULD BE VERY CAREFUL IN OUR DEALINGS WITH TURKEY. IT IS A VERY IMPORTANT MEMBER OF NATO AND SHOULD REMAIN A STRONG MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE WITH CLOSE OVER-ALL RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE U.S. THE PRESIDENT AGREED WITH THIS.

11. ENERGY: PRESIDENT GISCARD TURNED THE CONVERSATION TO ENERGY AND EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT PRESSURE ON FRANCE TO CONFORM TO U.S. VIEWS. HOWEVER, WHEN THE SECRETARY ASKED HIM TO CITE SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF PRESSURE, THE PRESIDENT ADMITTED THAT THERE WERE NONE AT PRESENT. THE SECRETARY THEN WENT OVER THE MAIN POINTS OF HIS UPCOMING SPEECH TO THE I.E.A. WHICH HE SAID FOLLOWS LINES DESIRED BY FRANCE; NAMELY THAT FRANCE SHOULD RECONVENE THE PREPARATORY CONFERENCE UNDER FRENCH CHAIRMANSHIP AND THAT THREE COMMISSIONS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO DEAL WITH ENERGY, OTHER RAW MATERIALS, AND THE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT ENERGY MUST RECEIVE PRIORITY IN EMPHASIS OVER OTHER RAW MATERIALS. HE ADDED THAT, FROM HIS TALKS WITH THEM, HE FELT YAMANI AND OTHER INFLUENTIAL FIGURES AMONG THE OIL PRODUCERS WOULD ACCEPT THE COMMISSION APPROACH AND WOULD NOT INSIST THAT CONCLUSIONS IN THE VARIOUS AREAS BE REACHED SIMULTANEOUSLY OR THAT A STRICTLY PARALLEL TIME SCHEDULE BE FOLLOWED. HE SAID THAT HE

THOUGHT THE U.S. AND FRANCE COULD WORK TOGETHER
TO MAKE THE CONFERENCE A SUCCESS BECAUSE THERE ARE
REALLY NO BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US.

12. THE QUESTION OF THE NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE
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CONFERENCE WAS RAISED. SECRETARY KISSINGER SAID THAT
IN HIS KANSAS CITY SPEECH HE PROPOSED THAT THE SAME
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES BE INCLUDED AS IN THE PREPCON,
BUT THAT THIS IS NOT A CRUCIAL POINT WITH US. PRES
GISCARD INDICATED HE PREFERRED EXPANSION OF THE NUMBER
TO AROUND 27 IN ORDER TO SECURE BROADER REPRESENTATION
OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BUT THAT THE NUMBER OF
PARTICIPANTS WAS NOT A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE FOR FRANCE
EITHER.

13. SAUVAGNARGUES SAID THE CONFERENCE THIS TIME SHOULD
NOT FOCUS ON AN AGENDA BUT ON THREE BASIC SUBJECT,
I.E. ENERGY, OTHER RAW MATERIALS AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES. HE ADDED THAT THE GOAL OF THE CONFERENCE
AT THE NEXT STAGE SHOULD NOT BE SO MUCH TO REACH CON-
CLUSIONS AS TO ESTABLISH A STRUCTURE FOR FUTURE
DISCUSSIONS. THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE GLOBAL. THE
SECRETARY AGREED BUT EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT ENERGY
SHOULD HAVE PRIORITY. HE POINTED OUT THAT, EXCEPT
FOR STATE, ALL OF THE DEPARTMENTS CONCERNED WITH
ECONOMIC QUESTIONS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
WERE SERIOUSLY OPPOSED TO CONSIDERING OTHER RAW
MATERIALS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONFERENCE, BUT
THAT PRESIDENT FORD HAD GONE AGAINST THE OTHER
DEPARTMENTS' ADVICE AND HAD APPROVED THE SECRETARY'S
KANSAS CITY SPEECH.

14. PRES GISCARD MENTIONED THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF
UNDER SECRETARY ROBINSON AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ENDERS. HE SAID THAT THE INFLEXIBILITY SOMETIMES
SHOWN BY ENDERS COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. SOME SUBJECTS
MUST BE DISCUSSED WHICH ENDERS OPPOSED DISCUSSING.
FOR EXAMPLE, VENEZUELA HAD PROPOSED A STUDY OF THE
PURCHASING POWER OF EXPORTED RAW MATERIALS WHICH
ENDERS STRENUOUSLY OPPOSED. PRES GISCARD FELT THAT
THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES TAKE THESE QUESTIONS MOST
SERIOUSLY AND THAT THE U.S. PERHAPS UNDERESTIMATES
THE HARM DONE TO ITS IMAGE IN THE EYES OF THE THIRD
WORLD BY NOT BEING MORE SYMPATHETIC TOWARDS WHAT THEY
REGARD AS REAL PROBLEMS. AGAIN, BY WAY OF
ILLUSTRATION, HE SAID ALGERIA'S UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM
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HAS A PROFOUND EFFECT ON ALGIERS' APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS.

15. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED HIS VERY HIGH REGARD FOR BOTH UNDER SECRETARY ROBINSON AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS. HE SAID THEY BOTH MAKE A VERY VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, PARTICULARLY IN THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE CONFERENCE.

16. WITH REGARD TO THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING THE VIEWS AND PROBLEMS OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THE SECRETARY RECOMMENDED THAT PRES GISCARD LET PRES FORD KNOW HIS VIEWS. HE SAID PRES FORD SYMPATHIZES WITH PRES GISCARD'S POINT OF VIEW ON DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS BUT IS UNDER GREAT PRESSURE IN THE U.S. TO MAINTAIN A FIRM LINE, PARTICULARLY ON ISSUES SUCH AS ORGANIZED MARKETS. THE SECRETARY ALSO URGED PRESIDENT GISCARD TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TH PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENNE TO DISSUADE HIM FROM RAISING ABSTRACTIONS SUCH AS A "NEW ECONOMIC ORDER", WHICH TEND TO EXCITE PROFOUND OPPOSITION IN THE U.S. IT IS MUCH MORE PROFITABLE TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC ISSUES AND SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS, THE SECRETARY CONTENDED.

17. SECRETARY KISSINGER SUGGESTED FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND FRENCH SIDES PRIOR TO THE NEXT ROUND OF THE ENERGY CONFERENCE. PRES GISCARD AGREED AND EMPHASIZED THAT IF NOTHING IS DONE ABOUT A NEW CONFERENCE THE PRICE OF OIL WILL BE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED IN SEPTEMBER, FAR MORE THAN THE RANGE OF 10 TO 15 PERCENT WHICH OTHERWISE WILL DOUBTLESS BE ENACTED. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT PRICE INCREASES OF SUCH MAGNITUDES WOULD HAVE VERY ADVERSE REPERCUSSIONS IN THE U.S. PRESIDENT FORD WANTS A STRUCTURED DIALOGUE TO BE CONTINUED; THE PATH TOWARDS PROGRESS LIES IN AGREEING AHEAD OF TIME AMONG OURSELVES ON WHAT WE HOPE TO ACHIEVE.

18. SAUVAGNARGUES SAID THE GOAL OF THE CONFERENCE SHOULD NOT BE SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS BUT RATHER

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ESTABLISHMENT OF A STRUCTURE THROUGH WHICH THE COMMISSIONS COULD DO THEIR WORK IN THEIR VARIOUS AREAS. THE SECRETARY AGREED AND SAID THAT THIS WAS PRECISELY WHAT HE HAD SUGGESTED IN HIS KANSAS CITY SPEECH.

19. PRESIDENT GISCARD SAID HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO

SEEING PRESIDENT FORD ON THURSDAY, AT WHICH TIME THEY
COULD CONTINUE A DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES RAISED AT
THE BREAKFAST. THE THREE BASIC TOPICS FOR THIS DIS-
CUSSION MIGHT BE, IN HIS OPINION, (1) A REVIEW OF THE
VIETNAM SITUATION AND OTHER AREAS POSING DIFFICULT
POLITICAL PROBLEMS, (2) ISSUES OF EUROPEAN UNION, AND
(3) THE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, INCLUDING
ENERGY PROBLEMS. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT PRES
FORD WAS GRATEFUL FOR PRES GISCARD COMING TO BRUSSELS.
THE FIRST TWO ITEMS MENTIONED BY PRESIDENT GISCARD
ARE NON-CONTROVERSIAL, AND THE THIRD POINT, NAMELY
THAT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, SHOULD BE STRESSED.

20. INSOFAR AS THE UPPCOMING PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE ON
ENERGY IS CONCERNED, WE WANT TO SEE IT SUCCEED. THE
CHAIRMAN OF OUR DELEGATION WILL BE MR. ROBINSON, AND
MR. ENDERS WILL, OF COURSE, BE PRESENT.

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